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We explore whether foreign aid a®ects developing countries' creditworthi-
ness, as proxied by the Institutional Investor's measure of country credit
risk. Based on a simple model of international borrowing and lending, we
develop the hypothesis that aid reduces the likelihood that borrowers in a
given country default on their foreign debt. We then test this hypothesis,
using a panel data set that covers a large number of developing countries
in the 1980s and 1990s. Our empirical ¯ndings support the notion that
aid improves countries' standing vis-a-vis international capital markets.
However, the strength of this e®ect di®ers across types of aid and country
groups.
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In recent years, a substantial body of research has analyzed the impact of foreign
aid on growth, investment and capital °ows.1 While we share this literature's
interest in the macroeconomic e®ects of aid, the focus of this paper is both more
modest and more speci¯c: our goal is to explore whether aid a®ects developing
countries' creditworthiness, as re°ected by the Institutional Investor's evaluation
of credit risk. Do large aid °ows improve a country's standing vis-µ a-vis inter-
national capital markets? Does it matter whether aid comes in the form of a
concessional loan or as an outright grant? Does the e®ect of bilateral aid di®er
from that of aid given by multilateral donors?
Our interest in these questions is driven by the observation that credit ratings
play an important role for countries' ability to borrow abroad: as various studies
document, a lower rating { interpreted as a greater likelihood that borrowers will
default on their debt { raises the yield that has to be o®ered to compensate lenders
for higher credit risk (Cantor and Packer, 1996; Larrain et al., 1997; Eichengreen
and Mody, 1998; Cunningham et al., 2001; Ciocchini et al., 2003). Moreover, a
negative assessment by rating agencies may induce creditors to require higher col-
lateral, which implicitly raises the costs of borrowing. Finally, legal constraints in
several industrialized countries prevent potential lenders from investing in coun-
tries whose rating is below a critical threshold (Haque et al., 1996). Given the
relevance of credit ratings for countries' access to international capital markets,
a positive relationship between aid and creditworthiness would therefore indi-
cate an important way in which o±cial capital °ows could act as a \catalyst"
for private foreign investment. This would add to other channels through which
aid potentially raises investment and growth in developing countries { e.g. by
1See Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), Easterly (2003), Roodman (2003) as well as Harms and
Lutz (2004) for recent surveys on the aid-growth literature, and Harms and Lutz (2003) for a
study of the relationship between aid and private foreign investment.
1improving a country's infrastructure or the educational level of its population.
In section 2 of this paper, we introduce a simple model of international lending
to analyze how aid a®ects agents' borrowing behavior and the likelihood that
they will repay their foreign debt. In this framework, a transfer in a given period
lowers the net bene¯ts of future default and therefore raises creditworthiness vis-
a-vis international investors. The empirical results that we present in section 3
provide some support for this hypothesis: using a set of annual data for a large
number of developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s, we ¯nd that larger aid
in°ows result in an improvement of the recipient country's Institutional Investor
rating. However, the strength of this e®ect di®ers across country groups and time
periods. Moreover, di®erent types of aid seem to di®er in their e®ects: while a
greater volume of grants and technical assistance signi¯cantly raises a country's
creditworthiness, the relevant coe±cient turns negative (though insigni¯cant) if
we focus on the loan component of aid. Finally, our results indicate that the
Institutional Investor's credit ratings are rather persistent. Hence, it may take
some time until a given increase of aid is re°ected in a more positive assessment
of a country's creditworthiness.
The speci¯cation of our empirical model is strongly in°uenced by earlier stud-
ies on the determinants of country ratings (Lee, 1993; Haque et al., 1996 and 1998;
Reinhart et al., 2003) and by the literature that analyzes emerging market bond
spreads (see Cunningham et al., 2001, for a recent survey). However, none of
the investigations in this ¯eld considers the role of foreign aid. This may have
(at least) two reasons: ¯rst, it could be argued that aid only matters indirectly,
by in°uencing the stock of foreign debt or foreign reserves { that is, variables
which preceding studies use as regressors. Second, the contributions that an-
alyze the determinants of bond spreads focus on a limited number of (mainly
middle-income) emerging markets, for which aid does not seem to be of crucial
importance. As we will show, neither conjecture is supported by the data: our
results suggest that aid °ows have explanatory power even if we simultaneously
2include debt and reserve levels. Moreover, the e®ect is stronger (in terms of sig-
ni¯cance) for middle-income countries than for countries at the lower end of the
international income distribution.
The rest of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a simple
model of international borrowing and default risk that highlights a particular set
of channels through which aid may a®ect a country's creditworthiness. Section 3
describes our data set, empirical strategy, and results. Section 4 summarizes and
concludes. Information on data de¯nitions and sources are given in the appendix.
2 A simple model of aid and default risk
We consider a small open economy that is populated by a continuum of identical
agents whose total mass we normalize to one.2 The representative agent lives for
two periods and maximizes
E[U] = u(C1) + ¯E[u(C2)]: (1)
In (1), Ct is consumption in period t, ¯ is the agent's subjective discount factor,
E is the expectations operator, and u is a continuous function with u0 > 0 and
u00 < 0. For simplicity, we assume that ¯ = 1=(1 + r), where r represents the
risk-free interest rate o®ered by international capital markets.
The agent's ¯rst-period consumption is subject to the constraint
C1 = A1 + D2; (2)
where A1 is an exogenous pure grant (\aid") received from abroad during period
1, and D2 represents the agent's foreign debt to be paid back in period 2. We
assume that the country has no other source of income in the ¯rst period and that
transfers are low enough to guarantee that the volume of debt chosen by the agent
2The structure of this model is inspired by Aizenman (1986, 1987) as well as Eaton et al.
(1986).
3is strictly positive. Accordingly, the representative household is a \borrower" with
respect to international capital markets.
In the second period, the borrower receives a (non-stochastic) income Y2 and
decides whether to pay back his debt or not. We exclude the possibility of partial
default. Hence, the borrower has to decide whether to repay his entire debt
or nothing at all. Due to the risk of default, international investors charge an
interest rate ½ that depends on the (endogenous) likelihood of repayment.
If the borrower defaults on his debt, he faces a punishment ¦, which can be
expressed as a pure loss in income, i.e. the income of defaulting borrowers is
reduced without raising the income of lenders. We assume that the punishment
has the following form:
¦ = s(1 + ½)°Y2: (3)
In (3), s 2 [0;1) is a random variable with distribution function F(s), while ° is a
strictly positive constant. The assumption that ¦ is stochastic is meant to re°ect
the fact that the response of creditors to a default depends on a host of random
political and economic factors, which cannot be perfectly anticipated. Moreover,
we argue that deeper integration with the world economy makes richer economies
more vulnerable to debtor retaliation, and we therefore make ¦ dependent on Y2.
Finally, our assumption that the punishment in case of default is proportional to
the gross interest rate (including the risk premium) is mainly made to simplify
the subsequent analysis.
It follows from (3) that the borrower strictly prefers to default on his debt
in the second period if Y2 ¡ (1 + ½)D2 < Y2 ¡ s(1 + ½)°Y2. Hence, default takes
place if s < D2=°Y2: a high level of debt relative to the onus of punishment
makes it unattractive to honor one's payment obligations. Using this result, we
can rewrite the borrower's expected utility as
E[U] = u(A1 + D2) + ¯
Z D2=°Y2
0




u[Y2 ¡ (1 + ½)D2]dF(s): (4)
4When choosing the optimal value of D2 in period 1, the individual borrower takes
into account that a higher volume of debt raises the likelihood of future default.
At the same time, he knows that he is too small for his behavior to a®ect the
interest rate ½. Straightforward maximization of (4) with respect to D2 yields
the ¯rst-order condition
u
0(A1 + D2) = ¯(1 + ½)[1 ¡ F(D2=(°Y2))]u
0(Y2 ¡ (1 + ½)D2): (5)
The LHS in (5) re°ects the marginal utility of additional debt in period 1, while
the RHS gives the marginal cost of borrowing, adjusted for the likelihood of future
default, which is F(D2=(°Y2)).
To close the model, we consider the supply side of the international capital
market. We assume that loans are provided by risk-neutral foreign investors who
are aware of the domestic agents' incentives to repay his debt, and who are willing
to supply credit as long as the yield compensates them for the risk of default:
(1 + ½)[1 ¡ F(D2=(°Y2))] = 1 + r; (6)
which implies an upward-sloping loan-supply curve, i.e. ½ is increasing in the vol-
ume of a country's borrowing. Combining (5) and (6), and using our assumption
that ¯ = 1=(1 + r) yields
u








Due to the concavity of u, the LHS in (7) is a downward-sloping function of D2,
while the RHS is upward-sloping. The two curves are depicted in Figure 1. We
assume that Y2 > A1, i.e. that second-period income exceeds ¯rst-period aid.
Under this assumption, which implies u0(Y2) < u0(A1), there is a unique point of
intersection that determines the equilibrium value D¤
2. Obviously, the LHS moves
downward if A1 increases while the RHS stays put. This lowers the equilibrium
volume of second-period debt. A decreasing value of D¤
2 in turn results in a lower
equilibrium value of ½ (see (6)), which demonstrates that raising A1 reduces the
5likelihood of default F(D2=(°Y2)) { i.e., an increase of transfers in period 1 raises
a country's creditworthiness in that period.
The economic intuition behind these results is straightforward: giving aid in
period 1 not only raises agents' consumption in that period, but also reduces the
amount they wish to borrow in order to realize their optimal consumption path.
Since a lower level of debt makes it less likely that agents will choose default in
period 2, the risk premium decreases.
So far, we have considered an endowment economy, and did not allow for the
possibility that ¯rst-period aid is used productively. Our model is easily extended
by assuming that an exogenous share µ of transfers (with 0 < µ < 1) is invested
in period 1 and raises second-period income: If Y2 = G(µA1), with G0 > 0 and
G00 < 0, (7) turns into
u








Now, both the LHS and the RHS of (8) move downward as A1 increases: if aid
raises future production, it reduces both the marginal bene¯ts and the marginal
costs of borrowing. The e®ect on equilibrium indebtedness is ambiguous and
depends on the properties of the functions u and G as well as on the distribution
of s. Note, however, that the likelihood of default may go down even if D¤
2
increases as a result of higher aid in°ows. The reason is that the \consumption
smoothing" e®ect { higher second-period income encouraging agents to borrow
more { is potentially dominated by a \deterrence e®ect", i.e. the impact of current







2 < µ @G
@A1
A1
G , i.e. if the elasticity of borrowing with respect to
aid is smaller than µ times the aid-elasticity of second-period income. If A1 raises
D¤
2 while reducing the likelihood of default, aid both acts as a catalyst for private
capital °ows and improves recipient countries' creditworthiness.
Our model has been designed to highlight a particular channel through which
aid a®ects creditworthiness { namely, by lowering future debt and the expected
6net bene¯ts of a default. We are aware that we have neglected several important
aspects: ¯rst, while we have focused on the impact of aid on countries' willingness
to pay, a default may also be triggered by a low ability to pay: due to exogenous
shocks, countries may fail to honor their foreign debt even if the costs of default
outweigh the bene¯ts. We could have accounted for this aspect by assuming that
second-period income is random, thus allowing for the possibility that available
resources fail to cover repayment obligations. Without spelling out this exten-
sion, we believe that it would not change our key result: aid would still raise
creditworthiness, both by reducing future debt and by expanding future produc-
tion possibilities. Moreover, we have not considered the potential role of aid as
a signal to foreign investors: on the one hand, aid may raise creditworthiness
by indicating that a countries' economic policies are approved by international
donors. On the other hand, large aid °ows may be a sign of ¯nancial trouble and
may thus be associated with lower credit ratings. While these e®ects are beyond
the scope of our model, they should be taken into account when we interpret our
empirical ¯ndings.




Our aim is to test whether foreign aid actually has a positive e®ect on countries'
creditworthiness, as measured by the country credit ratings published in the
Institutional Investor (in what follows, we will use the abbreviation IICCR).3
3While Haque et al. (1996) consider the indexes published by Euromoney and the Economist
Intelligence Unit as alternative measures of creditworthiness, they observe that there is a \sub-
7As mentioned in the introduction, the use of the IICCR allows us to consider
a much broader set of countries than related studies on the determinants of
emerging market spreads. Many low-income countries do not have access to
international bond markets, but it would be wrong to conclude that perceived
creditworthiness is irrelevant in these cases: the perceived likelihood of default
may still a®ect the availability of bank loans, trade credit etc. Moreover, it is
those countries for which aid represents a sizable share of gross national income,
such that we expect our additional variable to be of particular importance.
The IICCR ranks countries on a scale from 0 to 100, with a lower rating
re°ecting a higher likelihood that borrowers in this country will default on their
debt. The ratings are \...based on information provided by senior economists and
sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and money management and secu-
rities ¯rms" (Institutional Investor, 2002:170).4 The ratings have been published
regularly since 1979, and the number of countries covered has increased from 96
in 1980 to 145 in 2000. When we started to assemble our data set, availability of
the IICCR was a prerequisite for accepting a country in the sample.5
The IICCR is published every six months (in the March and September is-
sues of the Institutional Investor), while most regressors are only available on
an annual basis. We decided to transform the original time series into annual
data by computing the (unweighted) average of the March and September scores.
However, our results are not driven by this choice: although the IICCR of a given
country may vary between March and September, the estimated coe±cients and
stantial degree of cross-sectional agreement among the ratings" (Haque et al. 1996:699). We
therefore use the IICCR as a \representative" proxy for international lenders' assessment of
default risk.
4As reported by Haque et al. (1996), the individual criteria used by banks to assess default
risk are not speci¯ed. Hence, we have no information on whether observed aid °ows directly
enter the ratings.
5The other criteria were that a country was classi¯ed as a middle-income or low-income
country in 2000, and that its population exceeded one million in the year 2000.
8signi¯cance levels did not change by much when we used only March (or Septem-
ber) values instead of averages.
We also decided to use annual data instead of some multi-year average, as
it is done in many studies on the macroeconomic e®ects of foreign aid. While
averaging is recommendable to smooth out short-run °uctuations if one focuses
on long-run growth, it would be questionable in our context: it is likely that
changing economic circumstances in borrowing countries are registered quickly
by banking and ¯nancial institutions, and we would lose important information
if we smoothed out annual °uctuations.
Finally, the fact that the IICCR is bounded from below and above suggests
to transform the data. Otherwise we could not be sure that predicted values are
within the interval on which the dependent variable is de¯ned. The transforma-
tion we chose follows Haque et al. (1996) as well as most of the other predecessor
studies:





However, this transformation does not drive our qualitative results, and our main
conclusions still hold if we use the untransformed IICCR.
3.1.2 Aid
The aid variable used in our analysis is provided by the OECD's Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) data base, and is referred to as \o±cial develop-
ment assistance and net o±cial aid" (henceforth ODA). It consists of grants and
of loans with a grant element of at least 25 percent; deducted from this are re-
payments of loan principal.6 Aid is measured in constant US dollars and divided
6Chang et al. (1998) have created an alternative measure { e®ective development assistance
(EDA) { which only includes the grant component of concessionary loans. Unfortunately, the
Chang et al. (1998) data are only available through 1995. In order to make use of a larger
9by population to account for country size.7
Later on we will replace total aid per capita by less aggregate variables, namely
the loan component of ODA, pure grants, and technical assistance. We will
also di®erentiate between aid o®ered by multilateral donors and \bilateral" aid
received from individual countries.
3.1.3 Control variables
In our choice of control variables, we closely follow the literature on emerging
market spreads as well as Haque et al. (1996). Moreover, the choice is motivated
by our model which suggests that variables re°ecting current indebtedness, future
income, and the costs of default a®ect a country's willingness to pay.
The ratio of external debt over GDP (DEBT ) is expected to have a negative
e®ect on creditworthiness: the larger a country's current repayment obligations,
the greater the likelihood that it becomes unwilling (or unable) to honor its
debt in the future.8 For similar reasons, the ratio of reserves over imports (RE-
SERVES) is expected to have a positive impact on creditworthiness. Finally, high
current account de¯cits may signal di±culties with repayment in the future. We
therefore expect the current account balance as a share of GDP (CURRACC )
to have a positive coe±cient.
The logarithm of the annual CPI in°ation rate (INFLATION ) and the growth
sample, we decided to stick to the original ODA series. However, since the evolution of EDA
closely follows the time path of o±cial development assistance, we do not expect this to be
crucial for our results.
7We decided to control for country size by dividing through population instead of GDP since
the e®ect of per-capita aid is easier to interpret than the impact of aid relative to some other
endogenous variable like national income. However, as we will show below, our main results
still hold if we use aid divided by GDP as a regressor.
8In our model, this e®ect could be incorporated by assuming that agents enter the ¯rst
period with a given stock of debt D1. It is easy to show that, ceteris paribus, a higher value of
D1 raises the likelihood of default in period 2.
10rate of real GDP per capita (GROWTH ) are used to control for macroeconomic
stability which is likely to a®ect both the ability and the willingness to pay.9
While our model does not deliver a clear-cut hypothesis on the e®ect of future
income, most studies ¯nd that growth raises country creditworthiness (see, e.g.,
Haque et al., 1996). We also include a standard measure of trade openness
(TRADE ) { exports plus imports divided by GDP { and the growth rate of
exports (EXPGROWTH ) to account for the possibility that more open economies
can more credibly commit to honor their debt, and that a boost in export revenues
raises repayment prospects.10
Finally, we use a measure of economic governance (GOV ), which re°ects the
absence of corruption, the quality of the bureaucracy, and the rule of law. Each
of these features is captured by an index that is published in the International
Country Risk Guide and assembled in Political Risk Services' IRIS3 database.
The measures range from 0 to 6, with a higher value re°ecting a better business
climate, and the composite measure we use is an unweighted average of the three
indexes. Our decision to control for the quality of governance is motivated by the
recent literature on aid, growth, and capital °ows, which puts a strong emphasis
on the \soft" aspects of countries' economic and institutional environment. It is
also suggested by Ciocchini et al. (2003) who ¯nd that higher corruption raises
countries' interest rate spreads.
Of course, the limited availability of these control variables reduces the size
of our sample: while we can use more than 1300 observations in a regression of
IICT on aid alone, the number of observations is reduced to 717 if we include
all the regressors mentioned above. In particular, the fact that Political Risk
9Following Haque et al. (1998), we chose the log of in°ation in order to mitigate the e®ect
of exceptionally high in°ation rates.
10In our model, the commitment e®ect of trade openness is captured by the parameter °,
which re°ects the severity of sanctions in case of default. It can be shown that raising °
increases D¤
2, but lowers the likelihood of default.
11Services started to publish its indexes in 1982 and introduced a new scaling for
their governance variables in 1998 prevents us from using observations before 1982
and beyond 1997. This needs to be taken seriously: as Easterly et al. (2003) as
well as Jensen and Paldam (2003) point out, many results in the literature on
aid and growth are due to a data-determined focus on a subset of countries and
time periods, and break down once the sample is expanded { e.g. by discarding
some control variables. We will demonstrate later that sample size also matters
in the present context, but that this does not invalidate our main results.
3.1.4 Lagged dependent variable
In addition to the variables mentioned above, we use the lagged value of IICT as
a regressor. Such a dynamic speci¯cation is suggested by Haque et al. (1996:718)
who ¯nd that \there is considerable persistence in the ratings, so that a country
tends to retain its rating over time unless signi¯cant adverse or positive develop-
ments occur". Moreover, the inclusion of IICTt¡1 is motivated by the observation




The equation we estimate is
IICTit = ®i + »t + ±IICTi(t¡1) + ¯ai(t¡1) +
K X
k=1
°kxk;i(t¡1) + "it; (10)
In (10), ®i is an unobserved (\¯xed") e®ect that may be arbitrarily correlated with
the other regressors. »t is a time dummy which accounts for time-varying factors
that a®ect all countries. It may capture variations in industrialized countries'
12interest rates, but also general changes in investor sentiment.11 The variable
ai(t¡1) is the logarithm of per-capita aid received by country i in period t ¡ 1,
while xk;i(t¡1) is the control variable k for country i in period t ¡ 1.12 Finally, "it
is the usual error term. The t-statistics presented below are based on a robust
covariance matrix that allows for heteroskedastic disturbances.
The inclusion of country-speci¯c dummies substantially reduces omitted vari-
able bias by allowing all time-invariant features that di®er across countries to be
captured by the ¯xed e®ect. We therefore believe that our approach improves
upon papers that use a set of dummies to account for regional di®erences, depen-
dence on primary exports etc.13 As with time dummies, the tradeo® is between
consistently estimating the parameters of interest and gaining additional infor-
mation on potential determinants of credit ratings: while the ¯xed e®ects do not
reveal the sources of cross-country di®erences, their use substantially increases
our con¯dence in the coe±cients that we estimate for the included regressors.
By using lagged values of the regressors we are trying to catch two birds with
one stone: ¯rst, it is likely that the IICCR value for a given country in period t
is formed on the basis of economic circumstances in period t¡1, especially since
50 percent of the assessment is published in the month of March. Second, using
lagged values is a simple strategy to reduce endogeneity bias.14
11While this approach does not allow to identify the potential sources of such time-variation,
the use of time dummies is less restrictive than, e.g., the inclusion of an international interest
rate as in Haque et al. (1996).
12Using the logarithm of aid per capita substantially improves the ¯t of our model, while the
loss of data due to negative ODA °ows is negligible (10 observations).
13An F-test that compares a pooled regression with the ¯xed-e®ects speci¯cation strongly
supports our inclusion of country-speci¯c dummies.
14Our results did not change by much when we experimented with other speci¯cations, e.g.
the September value of the IICCR and contemporaneous values of the regressors.
133.2.2 GMM estimation
It is well-known that estimating equation (10) by OLS leads to biased coe±-
cients. The reason is that the \demeaning" that removes the country-speci¯c
e®ects applies both to the RHS variables and to the disturbances, creating a non-
zero correlation between regressors and error terms.15 We therefore follow the
procedure suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991): the ¯rst step is to eliminate
the country-speci¯c e®ects by taking di®erences on both sides of equation (10).
This yields
¢IICTit = ¢»t + ±¢IICTi(t¡1) + ¯¢ai(t¡1) +
K X
k=1
°k¢xk;i(t¡1) + ¢"it; (11)
where ¢IICTit ´ IICTit ¡ IICTi(t¡1). The second step is to estimate (11) by
GMM. Arrelano and Bond (1991) demonstrate that, by using lagged levels of
both the endogenous variable and of the regressors as instruments, one arrives
at a set of moment conditions which allow to estimate the model's parameters.
These estimates are consistent if the error term "it is serially uncorrelated.
When specifying the moment conditions, one needs to decide whether the RHS
variables are treated as exogenous, predetermined, or endogenous: in equation
(10), a variable xk;i(t¡1) is exogenous if E(xk;i(t¡1)"is) = 0 for all s. It is predeter-
mined if E(xk;i(t¡1)"is) = 0 for all s ¸ t (see Bond, 2002:16). It could be argued
that our RHS variables are, indeed, predetermined, since it is unlikely that, say,
the growth rate of real per-capita income in t ¡ 1 is correlated with shocks to
IICT in period t. However, this would not be consistent with our argument that
the Institutional Investor ratings published in t are based on information gath-
15The bias disappears in panels with in¯nitely long time series (Nickell, 1981). For ¯nite
panels, Judson and Owen (1999) demonstrate that the severity of the bias depends on the
length of the time series relative to the cross-sectional dimension. Bond (2002) and Wooldridge
(2002) o®er excellent surveys of the problems associated with dynamic panel data estimation
and of the available approaches to arrive at consistent estimates.
14ered in period t¡1. To be on the safe side, we therefore specify all regressors as
potentially endogenous, i.e. we allow for the possibility that E(xk;i(t¡1)"it) 6= 0.16
Concerning the assumption of uncorrelated disturbances, we will apply the
test suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), which looks for second-order serial
correlation in the ¯rst-di®erenced residuals. If we have to reject the hypothesis
of no serial correlation this sheds doubt on our overidentifying restrictions and
suggests that the estimated parameter values are inconsistent.
3.2.3 Results
Column 1 of Table 1 presents the results of estimating (11).17 Most importantly,
aid has a positive e®ect, and the coe±cient is signi¯cant at the ¯ve percent
level. Moreover, most control variables have the expected sign, although not
all of them are signi¯cant. The coe±cients of the time dummies, which are
depicted in Figure 2 (but not reported in the table), also make sense, exhibiting
a sharp drop during the debt crisis of the 1980s and a slow recovery during
the 1990s.18 The probability value associated with the Arellano-Bond statistic
suggests that we can con¯dently reject the hypothesis that the disturbances are
serially correlated. Finally, the results con¯rm the observation of Haque et al.
(1996) that credit ratings are very persistent.19 On the one hand, this indicates
that creditworthiness is slow to react to a permanent increase of aid °ows. On the
16This reduces the number of moment conditions since we have to lag the x-variables by at
least three periods to use them as instruments.
17These values are based on a one-step GMM estimator, which uses an exogenous weighting
matrix (see Arellano and Bond, 1991). While additional e±ciency can be gained by deriving the
weighting matrix in a two-step procedure, these gains are small relative to the lower reliability
of the two-step estimator (see Bond, 2002:9).
18Note that the coe±cients refer to the ¯rst-di®erence formulation in (11). Hence, a negative
value indicates that, on average, ratings decreased relative to the preceding year.
19However, the coe±cient for the lagged dependent variable in Haque et al. (1996) is close
to 0.94, suggesting a substantially higher degree of persistence than our results.
15other hand, it implies that, although investor assessments return to some steady
state level after a temporary \aid shock", this convergence takes quite long and
may buy a country time vis-a-vis international capital markets.
It is puzzling, though, that the ratio of debt over GDP is insigni¯cant. This
is in sharp contrast to preceding studies, which identi¯ed the debt level as a
crucial determinant of perceived creditworthiness and interest rate spreads. A
closer look at the data reveals that one single country may be responsible for
this result: during the 1980s and 1990s, Nicaragua had debt levels way above
the cross-country average, with a mind-boggling value of 1064 percent of GDP
in 1990. In addition, the country experienced a hyperin°ation in the late 1980s
and current account de¯cits above 30 percent of GDP for several years in a row.
While we have no reason to distrust these data, they show that the Nicaraguan
experience is unusual in many dimensions. Put di®erently: our results so far may
su®er from the fact that credit ratings just cannot be as bad as suggested by
Nicaragua's ¯gures on in°ation, external debt and current account de¯cits.
Our conjecture that the presence of Nicaragua in the sample distorts our ¯nd-
ings is con¯rmed by column 2 in Table 1, which shows the results of estimating
equation (11) without Nicaragua: the coe±cient of debt is now signi¯cantly neg-
ative. Moreover, trade openness has made it back into the club of signi¯cant
regressors. Finally, aid continues to have a positive e®ect, now at the 1-percent
level of signi¯cance.
Of course, Nicaragua is not the only country that experienced periods of ex-
cessive in°ation and indebtedness, and it could be argued that our results are
driven by some other in°uential observation. In order to check this possibility,
we removed countries that had annual in°ation rates above 500 percent or debt
levels above 200 percent of GDP for at least one year between 1980 and 2000.
By setting these thresholds, we tried to strike a balance between our desire to
eliminate \extreme" observations and the need to keep a reasonably large sam-
16ple.20 We also removed Jordan, whose in°ows of aid per capita in the 1980s
substantially exceeded those of other countries.21 Column 3 in Table 1 shows
that, quite surprisingly, this reduction of the sample { all in all, we sacri¯ced 92
observations { leaves the coe±cient and the signi¯cance level of aid almost un-
changed. Moreover, debt continues to have a negative e®ect. The in°ation rate
ceases to be signi¯cant, which con¯rms a standard result from empirical growth
research: while hyperin°ations de¯nitely have a detrimental e®ect on growth, it
is much harder to identify a signi¯cant role of price stability if one considers only
countries with moderate in°ation rates.22
To summarize: it appears that the presence of Nicaragua in the sample is quite
important for the coe±cients of some regressors { though not for the coe±cient
of aid {, whereas it does not really matter whether we include or exclude other
\extreme observations". In what follows, we will therefore work with a sample
that discards the observations for Nicaragua, but includes all other countries.
In Section 3.1.3 we pointed out that the use of the \institutional" variable
GOV as a regressor shortens the time series in our panel since the IRIS III data
set only covers the years between 1982 and 1997. Due to ¯rst-di®erencing and
our decision to lag all regressors by one period, the regressions including GOV
thus only used observations for the years 1984 to 1998. Column 4 in Table 1 gives
the results from estimating (11) without the governance variable, which allows
us to use IICT observations between 1982 and 2000. Most notably, aid still has a
positive e®ect on IICT, but the coe±cient drops substantially, and the signi¯cance
level increases to 8.5 percent.23 What explains the drop in the coe±cient and the
20The countries that satisfy the above criteria are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Congo,
Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Russia, Mozambique, Ukraine, and Zambia.
21Between 1980 and 1990, per capita aid received by Jordan was usually more than ¯ve times
the cross-sectional average.
22See Fischer (1993), Barro (1995), Bruno and Easterly (1998), as well as Khan and Senhadji
(2001) for a more recent analysis.
23Moreover, the Arellano-Bond statistic suggests that we can less con¯dently reject the hy-
17t-statistic for our aid variable? By re-estimating equation (11) without GOV, but
with time series of varying length, we found that the result is mainly driven by
the inclusion of the periods 1982-83, i.e. the years in which investor con¯dence
was heavily shocked by Mexicos's default and the resulting debt crisis.24 While
these observations do not invalidate our previous results, they suggest that aid
may be less e®ective in supporting creditor con¯dence during times of extreme
stress, when ratings are a®ected by rapidly deteriorating fundamentals and a
general feeling of heightened uncertainty.
This important insight notwithstanding, we will return to our original speci-
¯cation, which includes GOV as a regressor. The main reason is that, as we will
see below, this variable has a signi¯cant e®ect on IICT for certain countries and
time periods. Moreover, while using GOV as a regressor discards some informa-
tion on the e®ects of aid during the tumultuous early 1980s and late 1990s, the
shorter panel allows us to more clearly identify the impact of aid during periods
of relative ¯nancial stability.25
3.3 Robustness checks
In this subsection, we will report the results from replacing ODA per capita in
equation (11) by di®erent types of aid, from running this regression for various
country groups and time periods, and from experimenting with non-linear spec-
pothesis of serial correlation.
24A regression without GOV and without the observations for 1982-83 uses 882 data points
and yields a coe±cient of 1.82, a t-statistic of 2.25, and an Arellano-Bond p-value of 0.13. The
¯t of our model further improves if we also exclude the years 1999-2000, i.e. the aftermath of the
Asian crisis and the Russian default. In this case, we use 759 observations, the coe±cient of aid
is 2.52, while the t-statistic and the Arellano-Bond p-value rise to 3.26 and 0.33, respectively.
25Of course, GOV is not the only control variable whose inclusion reduces the size of our
sample. Hence, to be sure that our results are not an artifact of (non-deliberate) data-mining,
we ran a regression with aid as the only regressor (in addition to time dummies). This regression,
which was based on 1309 observations, yielded an aid coe±cient of 5.47 and a t-statistic of 4.20.
18i¯cations. Apart from testing the robustness of our ¯ndings, these variations
provide important insights on the channels through which aid a®ects country
creditworthiness.
Table 2 di®erentiates between various types of aid: column 1 considers only
pure grants, while columns 2 and 3 consider technical assistance and loans, re-
spectively. The other regressors are only marginally a®ected by this modi¯cation.
However, while grants and technical assistance have a signi¯cantly positive e®ect
on creditworthiness, the coe±cient for loans is negative and not signi¯cant. This
seems intuitive: both grants and technical assistance correspond to the type of
transfer modelled in Section 2, with technical assistance being more likely to
be used productively and to raise future income. Moreover, by establishing a
long-term relationship between donor and recipient country, technical assistance
expands the set of possible sanctions in case of default. Conversely, loans that
raise the future debt burden seem to be unable to improve a country's standing
vis-a-vis international capital markets, even in the short run. Columns 4 and 5 of
Table 2 show that bilateral aid has a much stronger impact on creditworthiness
than multilateral aid. This may re°ect the fact that multilateral aid frequently
signals situations of ¯nancial emergency, which would have a negative impact on
credit ratings. A second, complementary explanation for the stronger e®ect of
bilateral aid is based on the notion that creditworthiness depends on the expected
costs of default: multilateral aid may be less e®ective in raising these costs, since
institutions like the World Bank and the IMF are less credible to sanction default
than individual donor countries.
While grants and technical assistance are usually positive, there are several
countries where net loans were negative for some years, i.e. in which repayments
exceeded new disbursements. Since we are using logarithms, these observations
necessarily drop out, and the size of our sample therefore decreases substantially.
To make sure that this is not driving our results, we re-estimated equation (11)
using aid over GDP as regressor. The ¯rst column of Table 3 demonstrates
19that, with this speci¯cation, aid still has a signi¯cantly positive e®ect on country
creditworthiness. Interestingly, this now also applies to all of its components {
including loans and multilateral aid. However, as in Table 2, the e®ect of grants
and technical assistance is still much stronger than the impact of loans. On the
other hand, multilateral aid now seems to have a greater impact than bilateral
aid. The reason for this striking di®erence to our results in Table 2 may be
the fact that the log-transformation compresses the very large observations in
our sample while a mere division by GDP does not, and that a few in°uential
observations are thus driving the results in columns (5) and (6) of Table 3. To
test this conjecture, we removed the series for Jordan { a country which received
huge °ows of bilateral aid in the 1980s { and re-ran the previous regressions. The
coe±cient of multilateral aid (as a share of GDP) fell to 0.60 (t-statistic: 1.65)
while the coe±cient of bilateral aid increased to 0.52 (t-statistic: 2.44). This
partly re-establishes our previous result.
Table 4 splits the sample into middle-income and low-income countries, and
along regional dimensions.26 Columns 1 and 2 demonstrate that aid has a signif-
icant e®ect for middle-income countries, but not for low-income countries. This
is surprising, since we expected aid to have a much greater impact in those coun-
tries that rely most heavily on foreign donors. The fact that even large in°ows of
aid fail to improve creditworthiness suggests that the poorest countries are stig-
matized by a bad reputation, which is hardly a®ected by rising aid or changing
economic fundamentals. This explanation is further supported by the observa-
tion that the t-statistics of most other regressors are very low, too, and that the
coe±cient of the lagged dependent variable is much higher than for the middle-
income countries. When we look at individual regions, the results (columns 3 to
5 in Table 4) reveal that aid has a signi¯cant e®ect in Latin America, while it
26See section 5.2 in the data appendix for a breakdown of our sample into low-income and
middle-income countries.
20is insigni¯cant in Asia and Africa. Note also that the e®ect of the governance
variable is signi¯cantly positive for the Latin American and Asian subsamples,
suggesting that, during the past two decades, institutional reforms contributed
to restoring investor con¯dence in these countries. On the other hand, the coef-
¯cient of GOV is not signi¯cant for Africa { possibly, because this variable does
not exhibit much time variation in African countries.27 The poor performance of
aid and of most other regressors in the case of Africa con¯rms the notion that
countries at the lower end of the international income distribution are stuck with
their poor credit ratings, and that neither large in°ows of aid nor exceptional
growth is able to change this.28
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results from running the regression for
observations before and after 1990. While this break point is somewhat arbitrary,
it is likely that aid disbursement criteria and thus the impact of aid changed
after the end of the cold war. The numbers indicate that there are, indeed,
substantial di®erences between the two decades: while the coe±cients and t-
statistics suggest a signi¯cantly positive e®ect in both periods, aid had a much
stronger impact on credit ratings during the 1980s than during the 1990s. This
may result from the fact that the number of low-income countries considered by
the Institutional Investor has increased over the years. The weaker impact of aid
in the 1990s may thus re°ect the poor performance of aid in low-income countries.
An alternative, less \mechanical" explanation is based on the observation that the
average share of multilateral aid in total aid increased substantially between 1990
and 1998 (from 22 to 32 percent in our sample). Combined with our previous
27A possible explanation for the rather surprising negative coe±cient of the current account
balance is that improving fundamentals may raise countries' ability to attract foreign capital
(and to ¯nance current account de¯cits) before they are fully re°ected by better credit ratings.
28Notably, export growth is one of the few signi¯cant determinants of creditworthiness for the
African and the low-income subsample. We interpret this ¯nding as evidence of these countries'
dependence on raw materials exports.
21result that multilateral aid is less e®ective in improving creditworthiness than
bilateral aid, this may explain why both the coe±cient and the t-statistic of aid
are much lower in the 1990s.29 Note also that the role of debt, in°ation, trade
openness, and institutional reform varies considerably between the \lost decade"
and the \roaring nineties": this may re°ect both developing countries' progress
in liberalizing trade and improving the institutional framework and the shift of
investors' attention towards other hazards like low growth and high in°ation.
We also investigated the proposition brought forward by Hansen and Tarp
(2000) (among others) that there are diminishing returns to aid, and used the
squared value of aid as an additional regressor. The numbers in column 3 of
Table 5 support this idea: while the other coe±cients are una®ected by the in-
clusion of the nonlinear term, the coe±cients of aid and aid squared suggest that
aid °ows above 70 US dollars per capita have a negative e®ect on creditworthi-
ness { possibly because excessive aid dependence sends a bad signal to foreign
investors.30
Finally, we checked whether the e®ect of aid on creditworthiness depends
on the institutional environment and therefore included an interactive term { the
logarithm of aid times our \institutional variable" GOV { as an additional regres-
sor.31 As column 4 of Table 5 demonstrates, the notion that \money matters { in
a good policy environment" (World Bank, 1998:28) is not supported in our con-
text: while the e®ects of aid on creditworthiness may be nonlinear, the marginal
e®ect does not depend on the quality of institutions in recipient countries.
29We also checked whether the structural break was driven by a changing composition of aid
in terms of grants vs. loans. However, this conjecture was not supported by the data. In fact,
the data reveal that the share of loans in total aid decreased throughout the 1990s.
30Only few countries in our sample persistently passed this threshold.
31We excluded Nigeria whose per-capita aid in°ows are frequently below one dollar. The log
transformation would have turned these observations into strongly negative values, and this
would have distorted our results.
224 Summary and conclusions
When we started this investigation, we were curious whether aid could possi-
bly raise developing countries' creditworthiness and thus act as a \catalyst" for
private capital °ows. In this respect, our results are both encouraging and dis-
heartening: aid raises the Institutional Investor's index of country credit risk,
but this e®ect seems to be limited to the subset of middle-income countries. By
contrast, aid does not improve the reputation of low-income countries whose per-
sistently low ratings keep deterring potential lenders. It is hard to decide whether
this \debt intolerance" (Reinhart et al., 2003) is due to the inertia of investor
expectations or due to entrenched institutional failure in these countries. Most
likely it is both.
We also found some evidence that there are diminishing returns to aid: once
aid (per capita) exceeds a certain level, additional in°ows are counterproductive.
On the other hand, there is no support for the notion that the marginal e®ect of
aid on creditworthiness depends on the institutional environment in developing
countries.
Finally, our results shed light on the channels through which aid may im-
prove creditworthiness: technical cooperation seems to be more e®ective than
pure grants or loans, suggesting that aid improves a country's reputation when
it raises future income and its potential losses from default. This conjecture is
also supported by the observation that bilateral aid has a stronger impact on the
Institutional Investor's ratings than multilateral aid. On a more general level, our
results thus emphasize the importance to disentangle the di®erent components
of aid when assessing the e®ect of aid on macroeconomic variables. While this
paper has limited its attention to the relationship between aid °ows and credit-
worthiness, we are quite sure that this insight generalizes to other parts of the
aid-e®ectiveness debate.
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5 Data appendix
5.1 De¯nitions and sources
Institutional Investor Country Credit Rating (IICCR): Country Credit Ratings
published in the Institutional Investor magazine every March and September since 1979.
Source: Institutional Investor magazine, various issues.
In°ation: Annual percentage of in°ation as measured by the consumer price index.
Source: World Bank (2003).
Trade: Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a
share of gross domestic product. Source: World Bank (2003).
Debt: Total external debt divided by gross domestic product. Source: World Bank
(2003).
Reserves: Net international reserves (excludes gold) divided by imports of goods and
services. Source: World Bank (2003).
Growth: Annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product per capita based
27on constant local currency. World Bank (2003).
Current account balance: Current account balance is the sum of net exports of
goods, services, net income, and net current transfers as percentage of gross domestic
product. Source: World Bank (2003).
Export growth: Growth rate of exports of goods and services in current US dollars.
Source: World Bank (2003).
Governance: Governance is an unweighted average of three International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) indices, ranging from 0 to 6: Corruption in Government: Lower
scores indicate "high government o±cials are likely to demand special payments" and
that "illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of government" in
the form of "bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax
assessment, police protection, or loans." Rule of Law: This variable "re°ects the degree
to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to
make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes." Higher scores indicate: "sound
political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly succession
of power." Lower scores indicate: "a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal
means to settle claims." Upon changes in government new leaders "may be less likely
to accept the obligations of the previous regime." Quality of the Bureaucracy: High
scores indicate "an established mechanism for recruitment and training," "autonomy
from political pressure," and "strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes
in policy or interruptions in government services" when governments change. Source:
Political Risk Services
Aid: O±cial development assistance and net o±cial aid (2001 US dollars). Source:
OECD (2004).
Technical cooperation: Technical co-operation is the provision of know-how in the
form of personnel, training, research and associated costs (2001 US dollars). Source:
OECD (2004).
Grants: Grants are transfers in cash or in kind for which no legal debt is incurred by
the recipient (2001 US dollars). OECD (2004).
Loans: Loans are transfers in cash or in kind for which the recipient incurs a legal
28debt (2001 US dollars). OECD (2004).
Bilateral Aid: Bilateral transactions are those undertaken by a donor country directly
with an aid recipient (2001 US dollars). Source: OECD (2004).
Multilateral Aid: Total net aid °ows minus bilateral aid (2001 US dollars). Source:
OECD (2004).
5.2 Countries in the sample
Algeria, (Angola*), Argentina, Bangladesh*, (Benin*), Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso*, Cameroon*, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo Rep.*, Costa Rica,
Cote d'Ivoire*, (Croatia), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt Arab Rep., El Sal-
vador, (Estonia), Ethiopia*, Gabon, (Georgia*), Ghana*, Guatemala, Haiti*, Hon-
duras, Hungary, India*, Indonesia*, Jamaica, Jordan, (Kazakhstan), Kenya*, (Latvia),
(Lithuania), Malawi*, Malaysia, Mali*, (Mauritius), Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique*,
(Nepal*), Nicaragua*, Nigeria*, Oman, Pakistan*, Panama, Papua New Guinea*,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal*, Sierra
Leone*, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan*, Syrian Arab Republic, Tanzania*, Thai-
land, Togo*, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda*, (Ukraine*), Uruguay,
Venezuela RB, Vietnam*, Zambia*, Zimbabwe*.
Note: Low-income countries, i.e. countries in which 2001 GNI per capita was 745
US dollars or less (World Bank 2003), are marked with an asterisk. Countries in
brackets ar those used only in regression (4) of Table 1.
295.3 Summary statistics
Mean Max. Min. Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
IICCR 28.00 68.85 4.35 13.76 0.64 2.96
IICT -105.89 79.31 -309.05 74.91 -0.12 2.84
Aid per capita 35.48 468.26 -18.61 41.86 3.58 26.78
Techn.ass. p.c. 9.01 67.23 -9.27 8.61 2.17 10.35
Grants p.c. 27.12 416.89 0.36 35.20 4.25 33.98
Loans p.c. 8.36 140.70 -85.10 15.96 0.79 16.98
Multilat. aid p.c. 8.16 61.76 -25.40 9.41 1.65 7.00
Bilat. aid p.c. 27.32 453.40 -18.80 37.72 4.46 36.99
Aid/GDP 5.40 78.94 -0.55 8.01 3.30 20.00
Techn. ass./GDP 1.19 11.33 -0.30 1.53 2.57 12.21
Grants/GDP 3.94 49.67 0.01 6.06 3.23 17.37
Loans/GDP 1.45 29.27 -10.60 2.68 3.07 24.30
Multil. aid/GDP 1.78 24.48 -0.76 3.33 3.17 14.88
Bilat. aid/GDP 3.62 54.46 -0.46 5.22 3.65 24.49
GROWTH 1.22 16.54 -20.90 4.72 -0.77 5.29
DEBT 74.72 339.21 7.40 49.50 1.86 7.85
EXPGROWTH 9.16 283.76 -79.44 21.48 3.58 42.69
INFLATION 82.99 11749.64 -11.69 568.90 15.38 280.01
TRADE 58.27 192.11 12.35 27.58 1.12 5.37
RESERVES 27.38 276.91 0.04 29.06 4.35 32.80
CURRACC -3.77 28.71 -44.84 6.37 -1.25 11.58
GOV 2.85 5.33 0.67 0.86 -0.20 2.95
Annotations: The summary statistics refer to the 66 countries on which regression
(2) in Table 1 is based.
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Table 1: Aid and country creditworthiness
(Dependent variable: Transformed index of country credit risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample without NIC No extreme obs. without GOV
Aid per capita 2.262** 2.548*** 2.533*** 1.534*
(2.49) (3.12) (3.04) (1.72)
GROWTH 0.605*** 0.538*** 0.528*** 0.713***
(4.46) (4.34) (3.92) (5.40)
DEBT -0.009 -0.091** -0.099** -0.084**
(0.45) (2.11) (1.95) (2.28)
EXPGROWTH 0.025 0.021 0.032 0.031
(1.01) (0.88) (1.44) (1.37)
INFLATION -1.208** -1.383** -0.810 -1.379***
(1.98) (2.33) (1.00) (2.66)
TRADE 0.078 0.151* 0.219*** 0.117*
(1.03) (1.85) (2.74) (1.78)
RESERVES 0.222*** 0.221*** 0.241*** 0.192***
(5.65) (5.12) (5.22) (5.20)
CURRACC 0.014 -0.035 -0.018 -0.087
(0.14) (0.36) (0.19) (0.94)
GOV -0.141 -0.094 0.241
(0.10) (0.06) (0.16)
Lagged IICT 0.845*** 0.828*** 0.839*** 0.880***
(29.08) (25.45) (21.87) (32.07)
Observations 717 706 614 955
Countries 67 66 57 78
Arellano-Bond p value 0.17 0.30 0.22 0.03
Notes: In parentheses: Absolute values of t-statistics, based on a robust covariance-
matrix.
**, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5, 10 percent.
Column (2): Sample without observations for Nicaragua.
Column (3): Sample without observations for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua,
Peru, Poland, Russia, Ukraine, Congo, Mozambique, Zambia, Jordan.
All regressors are lagged by one period.
All regressions include time dummies.
31Table 2: Di®erent types of aid
(Dependent variable: Transformed index of country credit risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grants Technical A. Loans Bilateral Multilateral
Aid per capita 2.004* 3.595* -0.092 2.388*** 0.668
(1.71) (1.73) (0.14) (3.13) (0.99)
GROWTH 0.551*** 0.546*** 0.581*** 0.555*** 0.516***
(4.30) (4.19) (3.79) (4.41) (3.75)
DEBT -0.093** -0.088** -0.045 -0.093** -0.067*
(2.08) (2.04) (0.95) (2.15) (1.66)
EXPGROWTH 0.027 0.028 0.036 0.020 0.023
(1.20) (1.24) (1.61) (0.86) (0.90)
INFLATION -1.307** -1.378** -1.473 -1.384** -1.408**
(2.10) (2.30) (1.55) (2.31) (2.09)
TRADE 0.145 0.143* 0.157 0.160** 0.098
(1.59) (1.64) (1.51) (1.94) (1.16)
RESERVES 0.214*** 0.221*** 0.274*** 0.220*** 0.221***
(5.17) (5.33) (4.31) (5.05) (4.96)
CURRACC 0.012 0.001 0.002 -0.026 0.024
(0.13) (0.01) (0.02) (0.27) (0.25)
GOV -0.577 -0.726 0.195 -0.217 -0.373
(0.37) (0.46) (0.09) (0.15) (0.24)
Lagged IICT 0.836*** 0.827*** 0.833*** 0.825*** 0.849***
(26.76) (27.44) (18.83) (25.59) (29.35)
Observations 722 720 556 699 676
Countries 66 66 65 66 66
Arellano-Bond 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.29 0.65
Notes: In parentheses: Absolute values of t-statistics, based on a robust covariance-
matrix.
**, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5, 10 percent.
All regressors are lagged by one period.
All regressions include time dummies.
32Table 3: Aid as percentage of GDP
(Dependent variable: Transformed index of country credit risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total Aid Grants Technical A. Loans Bilateral Multilateral
Aid / GDP 0.413** 0.447** 3.909*** 0.342* 0.430** 0.711*
(2.52) (2.36) (3.38) (1.85) (1.99) (1.86)
GROWTH 0.605*** 0.582*** 0.562*** 0.583*** 0.597*** 0.579***
(4.53) (4.50) (4.29) (4.37) (4.48) (4.39)
DEBT -0.119** -0.106** -0.142*** -0.106** -0.108** -0.114***
(2.55) (2.42) (3.44) (2.28) (2.31) (2.63)
EXPGROWTH 0.028 0.028 0.032 0.029 0.029 0.027
(1.16) (1.22) (1.40) (1.26) (1.24) (1.15)
INFLATION -1.261** -1.330** -1.233** -1.282** -1.284** -1.343**
(2.09) (2.16) (2.15) (2.03) (2.08) (2.15)
TRADE 0.137 0.135 0.145 0.144 0.134 0.151
(1.49) (1.49) (1.61) (1.52) (1.44) (1.63)
RESERVES 0.211*** 0.216*** 0.229*** 0.217*** 0.214*** 0.215***
(5.21) (5.35) (5.50) (5.23) (5.30) (5.27)
CURRACC 0.028 0.024 -0.042 0.004 0.017 0.015
(0.28) (0.25) (0.40) (0.04) (0.17) (0.14)
GOV -0.318 -0.389 -0.725 -0.575 -0.583 -0.193
(0.20) (0.25) (0.47) (0.36) (0.37) (0.13)
Lagged IICT 0.835*** 0.833*** 0.821*** 0.840*** 0.836*** 0.833***
(26.10) (26.56) (26.97) (27.31) (26.27) (26.61)
Observations 722 722 722 722 722 722
Countries 66 66 66 66 66 66
Arellano-Bond 0.27 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.26 0.33
Notes: In parentheses: Absolute values of t-statistics, based on a robust covariance-
matrix.
**, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5, 10 percent.
All regressors are lagged by one period.
All regressions include time dummies.
33Table 4: Low- vs. middle income countries and regional di®erences
(Dependent variable: Transformed index of country credit risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Middle income Low income Latin America Asia Sub.Sah. Africa
Aid per capita 2.32*** 2.620 1.813*** 2.685 -0.774
(2.77) (1.16) (2.02) (0.89) (0.37)
GROWTH 0.801*** 0.066 0.457*** 0.681** 0.161
(5.19) (0.39) (3.37) (2.00) (0.88)
DEBT -0.215** 0.036 -0.222*** -0.501*** 0.049
(4.24) (1.05) (3.55) (8.02) (1.27)
EXPGROWTH 0.015 0.050* -0.036 0.111 0.056**
(0.50) (1.79) (1.10) (1.03) (2.36)
INFLATION -1.243** -1.364 -1.039* 0.374 -1.397
(2.18) (1.63) (1.74) (0.28) (1.56)
TRADE 0.169* 0.123 0.195 0.057 0.148
(1.67) (1.39) (1.51) (0.61) (1.46)
RESERVES 0.164*** 0.354*** 0.292*** 0.332*** 0.281***
(3.05) (5.98) (5.72) (6.92) (3.06)
CURRACC -0.019 -0.032 -0.359** -0.359* 0.026
(0.13 (0.31) (2.45) (1.75) (0.20)
GOV 2.045 -0.321 3.769* 5.260* 1.237
(1.20) (0.18) (1.72) (1.84) (0.49)
Lagged IICT 0.754*** 0.913*** 0.752*** 0.684*** 0.92***
(18.99) (36.92) (17.47) (12.30) (39.16)
Observations 467 239 278 135 181
Countries 40 26 20 11 22
Arellano-Bond 0.24 0.52 0.67 0.07 0.24
Notes: In parentheses: Absolute values of t-statistics, based on a robust covariance-
matrix.
**, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5, 10 percent.
All regressors are lagged by one period.
All regressions include time dummies.
34Table 5: Structural breaks and nonlinear e®ects
(Dependent variable: Transformed index of country credit risk)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Before 1990 After 1990 Aid squared Aid and Gov.
Aid per capita 4.236*** 1.661* 5.402*** -0.679
(2.69) (1.95) (3.27) (0.26)
Aid p.c. squared -0.636**
(2.15)
Aid p.c. * GOV 1.101
(1.37)
GROWTH 0.402** 0.540*** 0.526*** 0.533***
(2.31) (3.63) (4.20) (4.19)
DEBT -0.153*** -0.033 -0.087** -0.099**
(2.76) (0.63) (2.03) (2.17)
EXPGROWTH 0.002 0.025 0.024 0.020
(0.07) (0.96) (1.04) (0.80)
INFLATION -0.679 -1.361** -1.458** -1.338**
(0.63) (2.45) (2.37) (2.19)
TRADE 0.504*** -0.032 0.144* 0.176**
(4.97) (0.40) (1.79) (2.05)
RESERVES 0.303*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 0.216***
(4.84) (4.75) (5.19) (4.80)
CURRACC -0.167 0.015 -0.056 -0.041
(1.08) (0.12) (0.55) (0.39)
GOV 4.807* 0.515 -0.132 -3.259
(1.92) (0.28) (0.09) (1.11)
Lagged IICT 0.684*** 0.837*** 0.821*** 0.813***
(14.92) (29.08) (25.12) (24.26)
Observations 254 452 706 691
Countries 50 64 66 65
Arellano-Bond 0.18 0.95 0.30 0.35
Notes: In parentheses: Absolute values of t-statistics, based on a robust covariance-
matrix.
**, **, *: signi¯cance levels of 1, 5, 10 percent.
All regressors are lagged by one period.






















Figure 2: The coefficients of the time dummies in equation (11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 